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1. Introduction 
What makes pupils perform well at school? Does increased spending improve school results? These 
two questions have occupied governments, school authorities, teacher and parents for a long time. The 
reasons for this concern are obvious. There is mounting evidence that human capital investment is a 
key factor in economic growth. The trend towards greater public sector accountability implies an 
increasing focus on efficient resource allocation also in schools. On the individual level, school 
results, both in terms of quantity, measured by e.g. years of schooling, and in terms of quality, 
measured by e.g. grade point averages, exam results and test scores, are found to be key determinants 
of later labour market success in terms of earnings and employment. In many countries, educational 
policies, including the allocation of school resources, are designed to promote equality of opportunity 
by partly counteracting the effects of differences in family background.   
 These questions have also been debated in the academic literature for decades. Following 
the Coleman Report from 1966, which found that “it’s all in the family”, a large literature has 
attempted to estimate the effects the effects of school resources on pupil achievement. However, there 
is disagreement as to whether there are any effects of resources at all and, if any, how large they may 
be (Hanushek, 2003, Krueger, 2003). Similar studies have been undertaken on the link between 
resource use and school performance in Nordic schools. For instance, Bonesrønning (2003, 2004a, 
2004b) has used survey data from Norway. The main result is that school resources have modest 
effects on pupil test scores.  
 Estimating the effects of school resources on pupil achievement in an attempt to identify 
causal links, poses methodological challenges. To some extent, the challenges arise because 
authorities and individuals believe that school resources are important for pupil achievement, and 
behave accordingly (see Todd and Wolpin, 2003). School authorities may direct extra resources to 
low-performing pupils and schools to improve their performance (‘compensating resource allocation’). 
Parents may choose neighbourhoods and thereby schools for their children based on perceived school 
quality, which may be inferred from resource use. Teachers may also prefer working in schools with a 
high level of resources and a favourable pupil composition. This implies that neither pupils nor 
resources are randomly distributed across schools. The main methodological issue is how to separate 
effects of school resources on pupil performance from effects of pupils’ family background. 
 In the present paper we use a very rich matched register dataset for pupils and schools for 
two complete cohorts of pupils in the Norwegian lower secondary school, offering a number of 
avenues for research on this issue.  The rich set of family background characteristics in our data set is 
very important in explaining student performance and thus helpful in conditioning out any sorting of 
student to schools by families sorting to neighbourhoods. Conditioning on pupils’ family background, 
we are able to control for the compensatory nature of resource use and sorting of teachers when 
estimation regressions with and with family background variables. The rich data set also allows us to 
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investigate whether the impact of resource use differs between low- and high-performing pupils, 
across subjects and across scores obtained by exam results and by assessments made in classrooms.  
 We find a positive but modest effect of resource quantity such as teacher hours per pupil, 
on school performance. Observable teacher qualifications, within the variation present in lower 
secondary school in Norway, do not appear to have significant effects on school results.  We also find 
clear signs of compensating resource allocation and teacher sorting. 
 The paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2 and 3 we provide a short literature review and 
present the econometric specification. In Section 4 we present the data set, while the final two sections 
present the results and provide concluding remarks. 
2. Background and previous literature  
The modern literature on the effects of school resources and school organization on pupil achievement 
started with the Coleman Report in 1966 (Coleman et al., 1966). Coleman and his group of researchers 
collected nationwide data for the US on school inputs, socioeconomic background of pupils and test 
scores. School inputs had very little measurable impact on pupil achievement and school differences in 
pupil performance only accounted for 10-15 percent of the total variance. Family background and 
pupil composition had dominating effects. The main lesson from this study was that ‘It’s all in the 
family’. Thus, non-random distribution of pupils across schools means that adjustment for pupil 
composition is of vital importance when assessing school performance.  
 The literature on pupil achievement spurred by the Coleman report agrees upon the 
importance of family background, although the interpretation of this effect is far from 
straightforward.1 The question whether school resources matter for individual achievement, within the 
policy relevant set of input levels, is far more controversial. Most researchers seem to confirm the 
casual empiricism we all (?) have from own experiences; teacher ‘quality’ matters. In contrast, there is 
much less agreement when it comes to the effect of other school resources on pupil performance.2 The 
dispute is particularly strong regarding the impact of school resources measured by e.g. expenditures 
and teacher-pupil ratios on pupil achievement such as marks and test scores. In several studies, Eric 
Hanushek with coauthors do not find support for significant impacts of school resources on pupil test 
scores (for overviews see Hanushek, 1996, 2003). Measuring the effect of class size on test scores on 
                                                     
1 A correlation between parents’ education and children’s test scores may reflect that clever parents get clever children that 
do well in school, or alternatively that there are other factors than education behind the good environment for bringing up 
children in a family with high education. Causal effects are hard to identify for family effects, hence it is also difficult to 
assess the effects of policies directed at increasing the equality of educational opportunities (see for instance Black, Devereux 
and Salvanes, 2003).  
2 Interestingly, until recently there has also been limited support for linking observable teacher characteristics to pupil 
performance. The main reason for this lack of support for the importance of teacher quality is probably that variation in 
teacher quality is driven by teacher characteristics that are difficult to measure and not necessarily strongly correlated with 
formal qualifications. Recent work do find support for the importance of teacher quality on student performance by using 
very detailed data on matched student-teacher data and thereby identifying teacher fixed effects (Hanushek et al. 2004; 
Rockoff, 2004).  
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Norwegian data, Bonesrønning, (1996, 2003) also find weak effects of class size. Other influential 
scholars like Alan Krueger with coauthors have identified positive effects of school resources on pupil 
test scores in several studies (Card and Krueger, 1992; Krueger and Lindahl, 2002 for Sweden, 
Krueger, 1999). Even survey articles, based on so-called meta analyses of the same selection of 
studies, conclude differently. While Hanushek (2003) interprets the literature as evidence supporting 
the view that standard school inputs like class size or expenditures have negligible effects on pupil 
achievement, Krueger (2003) draws the opposite conclusion. Interestingly, several studies find a 
significant impact of the same types of school resources on post-school outcomes like final educational 
attainment and earnings (Betts, 1996, Dearden, Ferri and Meghir, 2002, Dustmann, Rajan and Van 
Soest, 2003, Wilson, 2002). 
 Controlled experiments would allow us to identify the effect of school resources on pupil 
performance: Let’s say we have two schools – one using a high level of resources per pupil (e.g. small 
classes) and one a low level of resources. If a random process splits the group of pupils in two and 
assigns each individual to one of the schools, no difference in (average) pre-school ‘ability’ would 
exist. If achievement could be measured by a test after, say, a year, the difference in the performance 
between the schools would provide an answer to whether more resources have an impact on average 
pupil performance, establishing one causal link between school resources and pupil performance 
(Krueger, 2003).  
 This type of experiments is not widely available and is hard to implement.  In practice, 
we must rely on non-experimental data and alternative strategies are needed to solve the inherit 
endogeneity problems. First, parents, teachers and pupils can adjust their behaviour in response to 
changes in school inputs and pupil composition. Second, school authorities and managers may adjust 
school resources to reflect different ‘needs’ arising form variation in pupil composition. Using class 
size as an example, pupil performance may vary across schools with small and large class sizes 
because of school policies, teacher adjustment and/or parental school choice, even in the absence of a 
causal class size effect. Teachers or school authorities may use small classes for less able pupils, 
parents may choose neighborhood based on perceived school quality (class size) and schools with 
small classes may also have other favourable characteristics (e.g. attracting good teachers).3 As noted 
by Lazear (2001), class size may also depend on how well-behaved children are in class and thus may 
well vary by neighbourhood characteristics, for instance. 
 The literature proposes two possible solutions to the endogeneity problem: 1) Natural 
experiments or instrumental variable estimators or 2) matching estimators. The typical example of the 
former strategy is to exploit exogenous variation in class size driven by maximum class size rule, 
(Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain, 1998; Hoxby, 2000; Browning and Heinesen, 
2003, and for Norway see Bonesrønning, 2003). When the sizes of the age cohorts are randomly 
                                                     
3 Another mechanism, analysed by Bonesrønning (2004a), could be that parents’ effort towards children declines when class 
size is reduced. 
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distributed across school catchment areas, an exogenous variation in class size will appear. These 
studies usually find very small or no effects of class size. Matching basically means that you ‘mimic’ 
the experiment design and construct a control group and a treatment group that are equal along 
observed variables (see Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1998). Machin and McNally (2004) use this 
strategy to find the effect of a change in organization of teaching on literacy in UK schools in 1997 
and 1998. They do find non-negligible effect for weak pupils by re-organising existing resources in 
favour of weak pupils. The effects are stronger for boys than for girls and the effects appear to be 
persistent over time. 
3. Empirical strategy 
The general aim of this paper is to assess the effect of school resources and teacher qualifications, 
during the 3-year lower secondary school, on pupil achievement at age 16 in Norway. It is clear from 
the discussion above that our non-experimental data raise a number of problems when it comes to 
interpreting the association between school resources and pupil outcomes. We have to control for 
pupil heterogeneity and try to account for the adjustments made by parents, teachers and school 
authorities. This section describes how we deal with these problems.  
 A preferred approach to isolate the effect of school resources in providing pupils with 
cognitive skills from the effect of family background and previous schooling experience, is to treat the 
learning process as a cumulative process and to control for family background variables measured at 
different stages – reflecting preschool and probably even pre-birth resources of parents - as well as the 
impact of earlier school experience of the pupils (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). However, as we do not 
have a complete set of preschool information and early school experience, we face a missing variable 
problem when we specify the relationship between pupil performance and school resources. Standard 
approaches to overcome this problem are either to use value-added approaches by approximating the 
previous school and family background by lagged test scores, or by differencing out unobservables 
over time or across siblings. Data to follow these strategies are not available.   
 Our strategy for identifying the effect of school resources and teacher quality involves 
using a rich set of family background variables. The preferred empirical specification is as follows:  
 
(1) ij i j j j j j iA a b c d k ε= + + + + +F S T Z  
 
where Aij  is the achievement (‘score’) for pupil i in school j. The achievement measure is based on 
subject-specific marks from exams, as well as continuous teacher assessment (‘marks awarded for 
classwork’), see details in section four. Fi is a vector of family background variables including 
parents’ education, long-term income and wealth, unemployment history, measures of family structure 
and family status in terms of married/divorced, immigrant status etc. Sj is a vector of variables 
reflecting the quantity of school resources, including class size and teacher hours per class. Tj  is a 
vector of variables reflecting the quality of school resources, i.e. characteristics of the teacher staff 
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(formal education of teachers, experience, gender and turnover). Zj measures the average ‘ability’ of 
the pupils in school j, proxied by the average expected achievement conditional on family background 
predicted from an auxiliary regression of Ai on Fi. We also include variables reflecting the urbanity of 
the municipality the schools are situated in. This is because some of the variation in resource use is 
related to small schools in sparsely populated rural areas. 
 Our focus is on the impact of school resources, i.e. the OLS estimates of cj and dj in (1). 
The major question is then whether Sj and Tj are orthogonal to unobserved pupil characteristics, e.g. 
ability.   
 Consider first the estimates of resource quantity. Pupils tend to cluster non-randomly in 
schools since parents sort in to neighbourhoods and school districts. If this process are sorting pupils 
with (dis)advantaged background into districts where schools have (low) high resource use, the effect 
of school resources on pupil achievement is upward biased. Peer effects, where pupils benefit from 
having clever schoolmates, are likely to reinforce this effect. On the other hand, municipalities may 
allocate resources in a compensatory way. Less resources are allocated to schools with pupils who are 
expected to perform well (for a given school environment) and more teacher hours are provided for 
schools with less ‘able’ children.4 Compensating resource allocation implies that a family 
characteristic that has a positive effect on achievement also has a negative effect on resource variables 
such as teacher hours per class. If this is the case, estimates of the effects of resources on performance 
without controlling for family background will be downward biased. Thus, while family sorting and 
peer effects are likely to bias the quantity resource effects upwards, compensatory resource allocation 
generates a downward bias. In the Norwegian context, we expect the latter to dominate.  
 The quality aspect of school resources may also be allocated across pupils in a non-
random way, possibly implying biased estimates of dj in (1). It is reasonable to consider the quality 
aspect to be captured by teacher quality, including aspects not captured by observable teacher 
characteristics. If teachers sort in a non-random way – for instance that highly skilled teachers sort 
into schools with high performing pupils - we face the problem of distinguishing the effect of school 
input quality from the effects of pupil composition.5 The assortative mat(ch)ing between pupil ability 
and teacher qualifications may arise from two different processes; i) advantaged families move to 
school districts with highly qualified teachers, or ii) teachers move to neighbourhoods and school 
districts with high performing pupils. In either case, estimates of teacher quality that do not account 
for the assortative matching will clearly be biased.  
 Although our preferred specification includes both Fi and Zj, we also report the estimates 
from specifications where family background characteristics are excluded. Comparing the two sets of 
estimates, we can study how the effects of school resources and school quality are biased when 
                                                     
4 Some resources may also be allocated directly to individual pupils in need of extra resources. It is believed that such pupils 
are too few to have a sizeable effect on resources per pupil measured at the school level. 
5 See Bonesrønning, Falch and Strøm (2003) for an analysis of teacher sorting in Norwegian upper secondary schools.  
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controls for pupil composition are not included, due to pupil sorting across schools, compensatory 
resource allocation and assortative matching of teachers and pupils.   
 Finally, our main achievement measure comprises subject-specific marks awarded for 
classwork (‘continuous assessment’) set by the pupils’ teacher. A potential problem arises if teachers 
are influenced by pupil composition of the class or school when marks are set.6 Teachers may have in 
mind that the distribution of marks within the class should not deviate too much from a "standard" 
distribution. This will, all else equal, make it more difficult to obtain good marks in a class where the 
average performance is high. Hence, relative marking by teachers can bias the effect of school 
resource use on pupils. The direction and magnitude of this bias may depend on the degree of relative 
marking and the degree of pupil sorting and compensatory resource allocation. In any case, it is 
important to include school average pupil characteristics to account for the possibility of relative 
marking.  
 We investigate the occurrence of relative marking by estimating (1) on achievements in 
national exams and comparing with estimates using marks (in the same subjects) based on continuous 
assessment. Using exam results only involves some drawbacks. First, since exams are given in single 
subjects only and not to the complete set of eleven subjects, we will have to compare exam results and 
marks awarded for classwork for individual subjects. This will tend to bias downward the effect of 
resources due to measurement error; since our resource use variables such as teacher hours per pupil 
are not connected to individual subjects. Further, exams could possibly contain more noise (but avoid 
relative marking) than marks for classwork, since they are based on a single test, while marks for 
classwork presumably are based on continuous testing throughout the school year. Consequently, the 
precision of the estimates based on exam results will be lower.   
 Although the main indicator of resource quantity is teacher hours per pupil, we report 
separate estimates for class size and teacher hours per class. We also test the hypothesis that attending 
a school with limited resources is likely to be particularly harmful to pupils with a disadvantaged 
background, by including an interaction term between school resources and predicted achievement 
based on family characteristics.  Finally, we investigate if school resource effects differ across 
subjects.  
4. Data sources, sample and variable construction 
Our sample covers all pupils who completed compulsory education in Norway (10th grade in the lower 
secondary school) in 2002 and 2003. We use three types of data, assembled from matching of a large 
number of administrative registers: Individual marks by subject, individual characteristics and family 
background variables, and school-level measures of resource use and teacher characteristics.  
                                                     
6 See Bonesrønning (2004) for marking practices in Norway at the high school level, and Møen and Tjelta (2004) for the 
importance of relative marking for accepting students to a university based on high school marks from different schools. 
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Marks and school identification  
Data collected by the Norwegian Board of Education, contains information on which school the 
individual graduated from, and individual marks by subject. Pupils are awarded marks in eleven 
subjects. In all subjects, marks are awarded for classwork. In addition, all pupils are tested by a written 
exam in Norwegian, English or mathematics, and by an oral exam in one subject. The mark for a 
subject is the average of marks given for classwork and exam (where applicable). With two exams and 
eleven subjects, a little less than ten percent of the marks come from exams. Marks are awarded on a 
scale from 1 to 6, with 6 as the highest. Table 1 shows the distribution of marks for a typical subject 
for the two cohorts.  
 Based on marks awarded in individual subjects, we construct a summary measure of total 
grade points. It is not obvious how individual marks should be aggregated, as some subjects are likely 
to provide more information about overall competence than others. Thus, giving equal weight to e.g. 
mathematics and home economics may not be the most adequate. We have chosen a weighting based 
on the allocation of teaching hours given throughout the ten years of compulsory schooling. 
(Weighting based on the teaching hours for lower secondary school (8th -10th grade) provides very 
similar results.)  
 We have information on marks for more than 55,000 individuals per cohort. Around 4.5 
percent are excluded from the sample; mainly due to missing information of family background, but 
also because they have too few marks or information on which school they attended is missing. 
Missing information on school characteristics removes around nine percent of the schools from the 
sample (but these are mainly small schools, thus few individuals are removed).   
School characteristics 
Teacher hours, pupils and classes. Yearly school level information on (i) the number of pupils by 
grade (ii) the number of classes by grade, and (iii) the total hours of instruction for grade 8-10 are 
collected from the Norwegian Compulsory School Information System.  
 Instruction typically takes place within classes, but the number of teachers occupied with 
pupils belonging to a given class varies across subjects, classes, grades and schools. Teacher hours 
during a school year (TH), relative to the number of pupils (P), constitute an overall measure of 
instruction resources. This measure can be decomposed into teacher hours per class (C) and number of 
classes per pupil, i.e.  
 
(2) 
P
C
C
TH
P
TH ×=  
 
 Teacher intensity, (TH/P), is increased by smaller classes and more teacher hours per 
class. The three variables in (2) are constructed as averages of the three years prior to graduation, to 
reflect teacher input during the whole period the pupil attended lower secondary school.  
10 
 Table 2 and Figure 1 and 2 illustrate a number of important features of variation in 
teacher input relative to the number of pupils. First, class size is (of course) closely related to cohort 
size and a huge part of the overall variation is found in schools with only one class per grade. 25 
percent of the schools have less than 12 pupils per class, see Table 2. Sparsely populated areas explain 
class size below 15. The relationship in Figure 1 between average class size and number of pupils 
contains the familiar discontinuity around 30, 60, 90 etc. reflecting regulations on maximum class size. 
Second, teacher hours per class are not closely related to school size. There are some indications that 
hours per class are increasing with size and the variation is larger among small schools, see Figure 2. 
Third, the variation in the overall measure ‘teacher hours per pupil’ is huge, and completely dominated 
by few pupils per class in the smallest schools, see Table 2. Although the variation in teacher intensity 
is considerably lower among schools with more than one class per grade, the 90-10 differential in 
teacher hours per pupil is nearly 50 percent.  Larger schools have less teacher hours per pupil, partly 
driven by the larger class size. 
 Teacher qualifications, turnover, age profile and gender composition. The teacher 
statistics enables us to construct measures reflecting the level of formal qualifications, age profile, 
gender composition and turnover of the teacher staff. Unfortunately, teacher characteristics are based 
on the total staff, i.e. not matched to grades or classes in which the teachers work, and private schools 
are not included. We include as explanatory variables the share of teachers without formal teacher 
qualifications (‘unskilled’), the share of teachers with education at higher university level (‘high-
skilled’) and a dummy variable indicating whether the head teacher has education at higher university 
level.  Annual teacher flows in and out of each school can be identified, although not by grade 
affiliation. For each year, we calculate the churning rate, i.e. the sum of hirings and separations in 
excess of changes in the number of teachers employed, divided by the average number of teachers. 
The age and gender distributions of each school’s teacher staff is measured by the fraction of teachers 
below age 30 and the proportion of females.  All these variables are calculated as averages over the 
three years prior to graduation. 
 Urbanicity. Regional effects may affect our estimates in several ways. There may be 
regional differences in achievement levels (given family background), e.g. between urban and rural 
areas. To the extent that these differences affect resource allocation, one should control for region in 
the estimations. There may also be regional norms for setting marks. However, a substantial share of 
the "exogenous" variation in resource use is associated with regional differences. Some of the 
variation in class size relates to differences in population density, although this effect is mitigated 
when we exclude small schools from the sample. Including county fixed effects may also ignore part 
of the "administrative" variation in resource use. For a substantial number of pupils (and schools), the 
county is the administrative level at which school resources are allocated (typically in the capital 
Oslo). We have therefore chosen to control for regional effects by including dummies reflecting 
Statistics Norway's urbanicity classification of municipalities (seven categories). 
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 We exclude schools with less than two classes per grade. This restriction is partly 
motivated by policy relevance. Reduction in standard class size towards a level below 20 is unlikely 
and increasing decentralization of schools involving smaller classes is hardly an issue. Our estimated 
effects are likely to be driven by variation in school size if we include all schools. The school size 
restriction removes around half of the schools and 15 percent of the pupils from the sample. Our 
estimating sample thus consists of 82 000 pupils from around 550 schools. 
Pupil characteristics and family background 
The register data contain detailed information on pupil and family characteristics along a number of 
dimensions. All variables are constructed for the year the pupil graduates. 
 Demographic information and family structure. We include dummy variables for the 
pupil's gender, quarter of birth (given graduation in the year they turn 16) and graduation in years 
earlier than expected from their age. Parents' marital status is measured by means of dummies 
reflecting whether they are married (to each other), cohabitants, separated, divorced or neither of 
these, and dummy variables indicating whether the father and/or mother is unknown. The age of the 
mother and father at the birth of their first child is represented by dummy variables reflecting age 
intervals. A detailed set of dummies reflects the number of full siblings, the number of half siblings 
and the rank in the birth order (of full siblings).  
 Parents' education. Educational attainment is classified into four categories: Lower 
secondary, upper secondary, lower tertiary and higher tertiary education. Based on this classification, 
we construct dummy variables for all combinations of father's and mother's education.  
 Immigrant status. Pupils with both parents born abroad are classified as immigrants. We 
distinguish between 15 countries/regions of origin by means of dummy variables.  Age at immigration 
for the pupil is defined by intervals distinguishing between those born in Norway or immigrated 
before they were three years old, and those who immigrated when they were 3-5, 5-7, 7-9, 9-11, 11-13 
or 13 years or more. 
 Economic resources, unemployment, disability pension and social assistance. As the 
permanent economic resources of the family are more important than current income during the final 
school years, family income is defined as the sum of the father's and the mother's taxable labour 
income during the last ten years (regardless of marital status). Dummy variables reflect the position 
(quintile) in the family income distribution. 
 Family wealth for the pupil is defined as the sum of the father's and the mother's 
individual taxable wealth for the year prior to graduation. Since wealth typically increases over the 
major part of the life cycle, we construct age-specific wealth distributions, where we divide families 
into five-year age intervals based on the average age of the parents. Dummy variables reflect whether 
the family belongs to one of the upper four deciles of its age-specific wealth distribution. (A majority 
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of families have negative taxable wealth. The tax value of housing, which is most common non-
financial asset, is far below market value. Negative taxable wealth is reported as zero.) 
 The parents' unemployment records are used to construct variables for the incidence of 
unemployment during the ten years prior to the time of pupil’s graduation. We ignore short 
unemployment spells and define a person to be unemployed if he or she was registered as unemployed 
for at least three months of a calendar year. We construct dummy variables, separately for mother and 
father, for unemployment in the graduation year, and for unemployment one, two, three, four and five 
or more years during the ten-year period prior to graduation. Similarly, we construct variables 
indicating the receipt of disability pension and social assistance. We define a person to be on disability 
pension if he or she received disability pensions for more than six months of the calendar year. Our 
criterion for defining a person as receiving social assistance is that he or she received at least Nkr 
20,000 (approx € 2,500) in a given year. Dummy variables for disability pensions and social assistance 
are constructed in the same manner as for unemployment. 
How much of the variation in school results can be explained by family  
characteristics?  
A major concern is that school inputs partly reflect the composition of pupils. The family 
characteristics serve the role of controlling for differences in abilities across schools, such that the 
effects of school resources can be given an “all else equal” interpretation. Below, we briefly review 
the estimated relationships between family background variables and individual achievement. 
 We estimate equation (1) above, with only the vector of family background variables 
included. The set of family characteristics ‘explains’ close to one third of individual variation in 
achievement. This is substantial compared to a specification with only school fixed effects included, 
which has an R-squared of 0.04. Thus family background is a much more powerful predictor of pupil 
achievement than is school attended. 
 Individual grade points are highly correlated with parental education, positively related to 
economic resources of the family, lower if parents have experienced unemployment or received social 
benefits, higher for pupils with united parents and also related to age (quarter of birth), number of 
siblings and birth order. Non-Western immigrants who are born in Norway, or arrived before school 
start, achieve on average approximately the same grade points as other pupils with comparable 
parental education and economic resources at home. Girls outperform boys. The gender difference 
amounts to almost half a point per subject.  
 Table 3 displays the contribution of different sets of variables to explaining the variation 
in individual school results. A simple gender dummy specification ‘explains’ about 6 percent of the 
overall variation in grade points. Of other family characteristics, parents’ education is by far the most 
important. Family structure also ‘explains’ a non-negligible part of the. At the margin, immigrant 
status does not contribute substantially, but given the relatively few immigrants the partial contribution 
is not negligible. Parental earnings and wealth do matter, even at the margin when parental education 
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and family structure are included as controls. Finally, information on parental unemployment, 
disability pension and social assistance received by mother and father during the last five years 
provides no significant marginal contribution to the explained variation, but the partial contribution 
(when no other controls are included) is substantial.  
5. Results   
Main results 
Table 4 displays the main results concerning the relationship between pupil achievement and school 
resources. Column (1) reports estimates without family background controls and suggests two 
important findings. On the one hand, achievement seems to be hurt if the pupil attends a school with a 
high fraction of unskilled teachers and gain from more high-skilled teachers. More female teachers 
seem to have a positive effect. On the other hand, more teacher input in terms of hours per pupil is 
associated with less favourable pupil performance.7 Thus, teacher quality seems to be beneficial, but 
teacher intensity in terms of hours per pupil is apparently detrimental to achievement.  
 These patterns are dramatically changed when family background controls are included, 
see column (2). First, inclusion of family controls flips the sign of quantitative school resources from 
significantly negative to positive, illustrating nicely the compensating resource allocation. More 
teacher hours per pupil do improve pupil performance, as the positive estimate is statistically 
significant. The average effect, 0.956, reported in column (2) is not large. The predicted achievement 
differential, all else equal, between a pupil graduating from a school at the 90th and one from a school 
at the 10th percentile in the distribution of ‘teacher hours per pupil’, is about 0.37. Thus, pupils at a 
school with more teacher hours per pupil are – on average - estimated to gain an increase in 
achievement of 0.37 points. This amounts to about one third of a mark in one of eleven subjects 
(where the range is 1 to 6). The standard deviation the achievement measure is 9.2, so the estimate 
suggests that teacher input measured by hours of instruction has a limited effect, although not 
negligible.  
 Second, the impact from teacher qualifications change considerably when we add in 
family controls. While the effects of high-skilled teachers disappear, the negative effect of a large 
unskilled staff in secondary schools is drastically reduced, with a p-value of 0.055. Moreover, a larger 
fraction of female teachers is now associated with less favourable pupil performance, although not 
significant. These findings reflect the sorting of teachers across schools and neighbourhoods.  
Table 5 reports correlations between family background, measured as the predicted grade points from 
a regression where only family background variables are included, and various school characteristics. 
                                                     
7 Note that teachers’ characteristics are measured at the school level and thereby of less interest for pupils in combined 1st -
10th grade schools. 
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There are clear indications of compensating resource allocation: Pupils with advantaged background 
tend to attend schools with relatively few resources, measured by teacher hours per pupil, teacher 
hours per class and or by pupils per class. There are also signs of assortative matching of teachers and 
pupils: Pupils with advantaged background tend to attend schools with more qualified teachers. 
Female teachers are also overrepresented in schools with pupils with advantaged backgrounds. Also 
note that there is a positive correlation between variables of teacher intensity and the share of teachers 
without formal qualifications. This may be an indication that increases in teacher intensity take place 
by hiring assistant teachers without formal teacher education. 
 Thus, failure to control for pupils composition is likely to create severe biases in the 
estimates of teacher characteristics effects. Non-random matching emerge because well qualified 
teachers move to schools in advantaged neighbourhoods or because wealthy, well-educated families 
buy houses located close to schools with qualified teachers. As the mobility of teachers across schools 
is likely to be higher than the residential mobility of families, we expect the former to dominate.  
 There seems to be no effect of pupil composition, as the average family background of 
the school’s pupils has negligible impact on achievement. Note, however, that this reduced form 
relationship may comprise numerous effects, possibly pulling in different directions, see previous 
discussion in section 3 and further results below.    
 The results in column (2) Table 5, suggest that effects of school resources are weak. It 
also explains a limited part of the variation across schools (i.e. school-specific factors). If we estimate 
equation (1) where school fixed effects replace the observed school characteristics, we get an R2 equal 
to 0.3197. The model without any school variables at all reports a R2 =0.3012. Since our preferred 
equation has an R2=0.3024, only 6% of the variation due to school characteristics is accounted for by 
our observed school characteristics. Evidently, other school characteristics like unobserved teacher 
quality, organisational practices, instruction practices or management etc. are more important.8   
 Both in the public discussion and in the research literature, it is commonly argued that 
attending a school with limited resources is likely to be particularly harmful to ‘low-performing 
students’. As we have no information on previous performance or ability, we test this claim by letting 
the effect of teacher hours per pupil vary with family background. Rather than picking a number of 
family characteristics (e.g. parental education), we calculate the predicted performance of each pupil 
from a regression model without school characteristics, cut the distribution in five and let the ‘teacher 
hours per pupil’ effect vary across groups, see column (3). We find no evidence in support of the view 
that more resources are particularly important to low-ability students. On the contrary, the marginal 
effect of more teacher hours per pupil is higher among pupils from advantaged families. The point 
estimates are 0.72 and 1.11 for the lowest and highest quintiles, respectively. However, in light of the 
standard errors we cannot conclude that high-ability students are more affected.  
                                                     
8 If urbanicity is included among the observed school characteristics, we explain 11.7% (rather than 6%) of the conditional 
between school variance.  
15 
 The results in columns (1) - (3) Table 4 are all based on the composite measure ‘teacher 
hours per pupil’, which can easily be split into ‘teacher hours per class’ and ‘pupils per class’, as in 
column (4). It turns out that both input measures have the expected sign and the equal-effect-
restriction is clearly not rejected. The class-size effect, however, is not statistically significant. In 
terms of predicted performance, the 90-10 differential in teacher per class is associated with an 
achievement differential of 0.28 points.   
 Regional effects are accounted for by means of six urbanicity dummies, explained in 
section four. A need for more detailed regional controls can be questioned. In addition to potential 
patterns in school resources across region, there may be relative marking within local areas. On the 
other hand, a substantial share of the "exogenous" variation in resource use is due to different priorities 
across local authorities. Some municipalities spend more money on schools than others. However, if 
we include nineteen county fixed effects, the qualitative results reported in column (1) - (3) remain 
unchanged (results are available upon request), although the estimates are somewhat lower and less 
precise.9  
Single tests versus continuous assessment   
The achievement measure used so far is a combination of marks awarded for classwork (on the basis 
of continuous assessment) and exam (i.e. single test) performance. The weight on the former, where 
the teacher sets the marks based on continuous assessment, is more than 0.9. Scores from the 
anonymous exams count for less than ten per cent. Table 6 reports the effects on exam scores and 
marks awarded for classwork, respectively, using an ordered probit model (since the outcome measure 
takes a value 1 to 6 for each pupil). For both types of achievement measures, each pupil has a score in 
Norwegian, Mathematics or English since they typically takes one exam test only. Thus, the effects 
are on the average achievement in these three subjects. Consider first the exam result with the 
composite resources measure in column (1). While a negative effect is found for the fraction of 
unskilled teachers, teacher hours per pupil does not seem to matter at all. The median fraction of 
unskilled teachers is only 0.022, and the difference between the 10th percentile (i.e. zero) and the 90th 
percentile (0.063) translate to a predicted propensity score differential of 0.063*-1.242 =-0.078. In 
terms of probabilities, this reflects a difference of 4.0 percent in the probability of attaining mark 4 or 
better. 
 Exam scores are correlated with pupil composition, as pupils who go to schools with 
schoolmates who have an advantaged background perform better. The positive association between 
individual achievement and the predicted score of schoolmates is likely to reflect sorting on 
unobserved characteristics that correlates with family background. It may also arise from peer effects.  
                                                     
9 As we have data for two consecutive cohorts, it is even possible to estimate the main parameter of interest with school fixed 
effects included. In a model similar to (2) in Table 4, the effect of ‘teacher hours per pupil’ is positive, but low and not 
significant, 0.416 (1.23). Access to more cohorts are necessary if this strategy is used to identify causal effect, and it is far 
from obvious that school fixed effects model is a remedy to handle e.g. compensatory resource allocation.   
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 The effects on marks from continuous assessment by the teacher in column (2) show a 
different pattern, except for unskilled teachers which has a similar negative effect. Teacher hours per 
pupil has a positive effect, but it is not significant by common standards (p-value is 0.099). The effect 
of pupil composition is strikingly different, i.e. it disappears, when we look at marks awarded for 
classwork. Sorting and peer-group effects should be equally important when achievement is measured 
by continuous assessments, compared to exams. Consequently, there seems to be a counteracting 
effect which nets out the total. Relative marking is a likely candidate as this would tend to give a lower 
mark, if the pupil have schoolmates from an advantaged background (given own family background). 
Similarly, if a pupil has schoolmates who on average have less qualifications, it is more likely that she 
gets a positive assessment from her teacher.  
 Separate effects of class size and teacher hours per class are reported in column (3) and 
(4), Table 6. Earlier patterns are recognized as no effect is found for class size. There seems to be a 
positive effect of teacher hours per class for marks awarded for classwork, but the effect is not 
significant at a 5 percent level (p-value of 0.065). It should be noted that we estimate the effect of 
average teacher input across grades (8-10th) and subjects, which may bias the impact downwards. If 
teacher input varies between subjects, the effects on the three main subjects in Table 6 will be biased 
downwards and the standard errors will be higher than for effects on average achievement.  
Effects across subjects 
Although teacher resources are not measured by subject, it can be instructive to see whether the effects 
of teacher hours per pupil differ across subjects. Table 7 reports the effects on subject achievement by 
subject, based on marks awarded for classwork (or the average of the mark awarded for classwork and 
the mark for exam when applicable). The fraction of unskilled teachers has a negative effect on 
achievement in all subjects, but the effect is not significant for Norwegian, English and Physical 
education, see Table 7. As the 90th -10th percentile differential of fraction unskilled teachers is 0.063, 
pupils in school with ‘many’ unskilled teachers workers achieve around 0.07 lower marks than those 
in schools without unskilled teachers (recall the scale is 1-6). Positive and significant effects of teacher 
intensity is found for Mathematics and, surprisingly, for Physical education. There is a positive but 
insignificant effect for Social science, and no effect in English. Since the largest effect is found for 
Physical education, one might question the causal interpretation of the teacher intensity effect on 
average achievement in Table 4. It should be kept in mind that effects on single subjects are downward 
bias from measurement error, simply because teacher hours per pupil is an average which do not 
reflect the teacher input directed towards a specific subject.  
6. Concluding remarks 
Behavioural responses from school authorities, teachers and parents may imply that pupils and 
resources are not randomly distributed across schools, and complicate the identification of the effects 
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of school resources on pupil achievement. This paper illustrates that these issues are not only of 
theoretical interest, but have substantial empirical relevance. In the present paper we use a very rich 
matched register dataset for pupils and schools for two complete cohorts of pupils in the Norwegian 
lower secondary school. The data allow for various tests of the relationship between pupil 
achievements and school resources. In particular, we focus on disentangling the effect of parental 
background and the effect of the quantity and quality of resources. In addition, we reveal the 
importance of compensating resource allocation by school authorities. Further, data on both national 
exams and on continuous class assessment offer an opportunity to test for relative marking by 
teachers.  
 Our results show that effects of school resources like teacher hours per pupil and staff 
skill level are modest, within the range of variation found in Norwegian lower secondary schools.  We 
find no effects of class size, but pupils seem to benefit from more teacher hours per class. By 
comparing estimates for single tests and marks from continuous assessment, we find no effect of 
teacher intensity on exam scores. The different coefficients on pupil composition, i.e. the average 
predicted achievement among the pupil’s schoolmates, for exam and marks awarded for classwork, 
suggest that relative marking is taking place. The lack of teacher input effects in subjects like English 
and Norwegian, combined with the strong effect in physical education, also suggest that (the variation 
in) these kind of school resources only explain a minor part of the variation in pupil achievement at 
age 16. There is no indication that low-ability students gain more than others from extra resources at 
the school level. On the contrary, achievement among pupils from advantaged background is 
(insignificantly) more sensitive to changes in teacher hours per pupil. Finally, we clearly illustrate that 
pupil and teacher sorting are empirically important as the biases in the estimates of school resources 
are huge, if we do not control for pupil composition by means of a detailed set of family 
characteristics.    
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Table 1. Marks in Norwegian (primary form, written) 2002 and 2003, percent 
Mark Exam Classwork 
1 0.7  0.4  
2 12.1  8.2  
3 35.2  28.0  
4 32.9  36.6  
5 16.6  24.3  
6 2.4  2.5  
 
 
Table 2. Class size and measures of teacher input 
 Percentiles 
 Mean 90 % 75 % 50 % 25 % 10 %
All schools (n=1133)  
Pupils / classes: 18.7 26.9 25.3 22 12 5
Teacher hours / classes: 1829 2156 1971 1807 1660 1524
Teacher hours / pupils: 173.3 380 142.6 85.7 73.2 66.0
Medium-large schools (n=559)  
Pupils / classes: 24.6 27.6 26.5 25.1 23.6 21.2
Teacher hours / classes: 1857 2114 1963 1824 1720 1621
Teacher hours / pupils: 76.3 90.7 82.6 74.5 68.2 62.9
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Table 3. R-squared with different sets of individual and family background variables. Total, 
marginal and partial effects 
Pupil and family  
characteristics  Specification and controls  Total Marginal Partial 
I. Gender  Dummy-variable: Girl=1 0.06 0.06 0.06 
II. Parental educational  
     attainment  
Educational attainment of mother and 
father (five groups, incl. missing), full 
interaction.  
0.23 0.17 0.17 
III. Family structure  
Marital/co-habital status of the parents 
includes divorced and separated, number 
of full siblings and half-siblings. Birth 
quarter and order (among full siblings).  
0.28 0.05 0.12 
IV. Immigrant status 
Country of origin (grouped). Age at 
immigration;  
[0-3), [3,6), [7,9), [9,11), [11,13) and 
13+  
0.29 0.01 0.03 
V. Economic resources  
Parental earnings during school years 
(age 6-15) and financial wealth (8th , 9th 
and 10th decile)  
0.31 0.02 0.12 
VI. Parental unemployment 
disability pension and social 
assistance  
Parental unemployment, disability  
pension and social assistance by M and 
F during the last five years.  
0.31 0.00 0.10 
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Table 4. School resources and pupil achievement. Average across subjects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Combined primary and secondary school -1.522 (1.378) 
-1.766 
(1.021) 
-1.751 
(1.021) 
-1.706 
(1.042) 
Unskilled teachers (fraction) sec.school -14.143 (3.100)** 
-4.792 
(2.493) 
-4.795 
(2.494) 
-4.480 
(2.505) 
Unskilled teachers (fraction)comb.school  4.992 (8.389) 
7.249 
(6.497) 
7.345 
(6.496) 
7.336 
(6.466) 
High-skilled teachers(fraction)sec.school 4.303 (1.509)** 
-0.988 
(1.014) 
-0.964 
(1.012) 
-0.997 
(1.014) 
High-skilled teachers 
(fraction)comb.school 
-2.840 
(6.312) 
-0.322 
(4.358) 
-0.356 
(4.345) 
-0.561 
(4.390) 
Female teachers 
 (fraction) sec.school 
3.258 
(1.085)** 
-1.437 
(0.743) 
-1.443 
(0.743) 
-1.438 
(0.742) 
Female teachers  
(fraction)comb.school  
6.103 
(2.079)** 
1.834 
(1.458) 
1.807 
(1.458) 
1.774 
(1.471) 
Young teachers  
(fraction age < 30)  secondary school 
-2.154 
(1.141) 
-0.252 
(0.922) 
-0.233 
(0.922) 
-0.255 
(0.925) 
Young teachers  
(fraction age < 30)  combined school 
0.072 
(2.436) 
0.734 
(2.363) 
0.779 
(2.362) 
0.713 
(2.357) 
Teacher turnover rate, sec.school 0.940 (0.853) 
0.360 
(0.662) 
0.349 
(0.662) 
0.369 
(0.662) 
Teacher turnover rate, combined school -3.432 (2.701) 
-1.483 
(2.342) 
-1.504 
(2.338) 
-1.491 
(2.334) 
School average of Pred(Aij|Fj) in second 
quintile  
-0.100 
(0.168) 
-0.107 
(0.168) 
-0.094 
(0.168) 
School average of Pred(Aij|Fj) in third 
quintile  
-0.307 
(0.170) 
-0.316 
(0.169) 
-0.304 
(0.170) 
School average of Pred(Aij|Fj) in fourth 
quintile  
0.013 
(0.167) 
0.005 
(0.167) 
0.015 
(0.167) 
School average of Pred(Aij|Fj) in fifth 
quintile  
-0.077 
(0.194) 
-0.075 
(0.193) 
-0.072 
(0.195) 
Ln (Teacher hours/ Pupils)  
-1.833 
(0.612)** 
0.956 
(0.405)* 
  
*Pred(Aij|Fj) in first quintile    0.717 (0.409)  
* Pred(Aij|Fj) in second quintile   0.837 (0.406)*  
* Pred(Aij|Fj) in third quintile   0.956 (0.404)*  
* Pred(Aij|Fj) in fourth quintile   1.070 (0.405)**  
* Pred(Aij|Fj) in fifth quintile   1.112 (0.404)**  
Ln (Teacher hours/ Classes)     1.055 (0.476)* 
Ln (Pupils/Classes)    -0.789 (0.577) 
Constant 48.000 (2.656)** 
38.785 
(1.824)** 
39.031 
(1.826)** 
37.526 
(3.684)** 
Other controls Examination in Norwegian, head teacher post-graduate education, year dummy, urbanicity dummies. 
Family backgr. char NO YES YES YES 
Observations 82,783 82,783 82,783 82,783 
R-squared 0.01 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Note: Robust standard errors by means of clustering on school. */** denotes significance on 5/1 percent level. 
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Table 5. Correlations between school variables 
 
Predicted  
grade 
points 
Proportion 
teachers 
without 
formal 
qualifications
Proportion 
teachers with 
post-graduate 
education 
Head has post-
graduate 
education 
Proportion 
women 
Proportion 
age < 30 Turnover 
Log of 
teacher 
hours/ 
classes 
Log of 
teacher 
hours/pupils
Log of  
pupils/ 
classes 
Combined 
primary 
and 
secondary 
school 
Predicted grade points  1.0000           
Proportion teachers without 
formal qualifications  -0.0612  1.0000          
Proportion teachers with 
post-graduate education  0.1020 -0.0662  1.0000         
Head has post-graduate 
education  0.0427 -0.0388  0.2655  1.0000        
Proportion women   0.0721  0.0969  0.1210  0.0631  1.0000       
Proportion age < 30  -0.0121  0.2447  0.0747 -0.0042  0.2853  1.0000      
Turnover  0.0103  0.2693  0.1442  0.0143  0.3083  0.4857 1.0000     
Log of teacher hours/ classes -0.0577  0.1120 -0.0717  0.0251  0.0125 -0.0164 0.0510 1.0000    
Log of teacher hours/pupils -0.1021  0.1579 -0.2360  0.0060 -0.0042 -0.0185 0.0384 0.7233  1.0000   
Log of pupils/ classes  0.0680 -0.0909  0.2311  0.0018  0.0244 -0.0151 0.0034 0.0965 -0.5055  1.0000  
Combined primary and 
secondary school -0.0408  0.0919 -0.2096  0.0074  0.3454  0.1111 0.0168 0.0892  0.2707 -0.2175 1.0000 
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Table 6. Effects on exam performance and continuous assessment. Ordered probit coefficients. 
Selected parameters 
 Exam marks 
Marks 
awarded for 
classwork 
Exam marks 
Marks 
awarded for 
classwork 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unskilled teachers 
(fraction)sec.school 
-1.242** 
(0.306) 
-0.677** 
(0.292) 
-1.284** 
(0.300) 
-0.681** 
(0.293) 
High-skilled teachers  
(fraction) sec.school 
-0.229 
(0.130) 
-0.123 
(0.126) 
-0.224 
(0.130) 
-0.136 
(0.126) 
School average of 
Pred(Aij|Fj) in second 
quintile 
-0.030 
(0.019) 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
0.004 
(0.022) 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
School average of 
Pred(Aij|Fj) in third quintile 
0.047* 
(0.021) 
-0.028 
(0.021) 
0.046* 
(0.021) 
-0.027 
(0.021) 
School average of 
Pred(Aij|Fj) in fourth 
quintile 
0.080** 
(0.022) 
0.007 
(0.023) 
0.080** 
(0.023) 
0.005 
(0.023) 
School average of 
Pred(Aij|Fj) in fifth quintile 
0.139** 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.023) 
0.142** 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
Ln (Teacher hours/ Pupils) -0.001 (0.056) 
0.084 
(0.051)   
Ln (Teacher hours/ Classes)    0.015 (0.065) 
0.109 
(0.059) 
Ln (Pupils/Classes)   -0.020 (0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.058) 
Other controls 
Family background characteristics, head teacher post-graduate 
education, year dummy, urbanicity dummies, subject dummies for 
exam columns. 
Observations 81,684 81,639 81,684 81,639 
Note: Robust standard errors by means of clustering on school. 
* denotes significance on 5 percent level. ** denotes significance on 1 percent level 
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Table 7. School resource effects across subjects. Selected parameters 
 Norwegian Mathe-matics English 
Social 
science 
Physical 
education 
Unskilled teachers 
(fraction)sec.school 
-0.126 
(0.282) 
-0.956** 
(0.257) 
-0.410 
(0.268) 
-0.808** 
(0.292) 
-0.713 
(0.381) 
High-skilled teachers  
(fraction) sec.school 
-0.239 
(0.111)* 
-0.119 
(0.114) 
-0.073 
(0.115) 
-0.175 
(0.125) 
0.121 
(0.155) 
School average of 
Pred(Aij|Fj) in second 
quintile 
-0.030 
(0.019) 
0.037 
(0.021) 
-0.007 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.024 
(0.028) 
School average of 
Pred(Aij|Fj) in third quintile 
-0.051** 
(0.019) 
0.022 
(0.021) 
0.018 
(0.020) 
-0.030 
(0.023) 
-0.058* 
(0.027) 
School average of 
Pred(Aij|Fj) in fourth 
quintile 
-0.021 
(0.020) 
0.066** 
(0.022) 
0.045* 
(0.020) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
-0.029 
(0.027) 
School average of 
Pred(Aij|Fj) in fifth quintile 
-0.045* 
(0.022) 
0.073** 
(0.024) 
0.035 
(0.021) 
-0.046 
(0.026) 
-0.030 
(0.033) 
Ln (Teacher hours/ Pupils) 0.054 (0.043) 
0.113* 
(0.053) 
-0.005 
(0.047) 
0.084 
(0.052) 
0.131* 
(0.064) 
Constant  3.636 (0.197) 
3.018 
(0.238) 
3.788 
(0.214) 
3.805 
(0.234) 
3.885 
(0.296) 
Other controls Family background characteristics, head teacher post-graduate education, year dummy, urbanicity dummies. 
Observations 82,766 82,757 82,751 82,756 82,670 
R-squared 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.13 
Note: OLS, robust standard errors by means of clustering on school. 
* denotes significance on 5 percent level. ** denotes significance on 1 percent level 
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